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Recent Case
EQUIVOCAL GUILTY PLEAS-
SHOULD THEY BE ACCEPTED?
North Carolina v. Alford, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970).
At his arraignment on a felony charge the defendant, when
required to plead, states: "... . Even though I am pleading guilty
to that charge, it is a lie on my part. I am doing so on the ad-
vice of counsel."' Should the trial judge accept such a plea?
This question has long been a thorn in the side of the administra-
tors of criminal justice, and courts have come to widely differ-
ent conclusions. The United States Supreme Court in North
Carolina v. Alford2 has added another dimension to the problem,
without offering any apparent solution.
Before a federal court may accept any guilty plea, even an
unequivocal one, it must determine that the plea is being made vol-
untarily and intelligently. Further, the court must assure it-
self that a factual basis for the plea exists.4  State courts, how-
ever, have a lesser obligation to their defendants who unequivo-
1. State v. Stacy, 43 Wash. 2d 358, 360, 261 P.2d 400, 401 (1953)
(emphasis by the court).
2. North Carolina v. Alford, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970). Alford was
charged with first-degree murder in a North Carolina court. The prosecu-
tor agreed to accept a plea of guilty to second-degree murder. While
pleading guilty to the lesser charge, Alford stated to the court: ". . . I
ain't shot no man .... I just pleaded guilty because they said if I didn't
they would gas me for it....
... I'm not guilty but I plead guilty." Id. at 163 n.2. See notes 8-15
infra and accompanying text for further discussion of the case.
3. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749-755 (1970); FED. R. CraM.
P. 11.
4. Authorities cited note 3 supra.
Recent Case
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
cally plead guilty. In state courts constitutional due process is
observed if the court establishes that the plea is voluntary and in-
telligent.5 There is no requirement that a state court take the ad-
ditional step, regarded as essential in the federal system, of de-
termining that a factual basis for the plea exists.6 But when a
defendant equivocates-hedges his plea of guilty with a protesta-
tion of innocence-state courts are now required to take the further
step of assuring that the plea is accurately grounded on facts con-
stituting the offense charged. 7
In North Carolina v. Alford" the defendant had pleaded guilty
to second degree murder on the advice of counsel. In court
Alford coupled his plea with a protestation of innocence. 9 The
trial court heard the evidence against Alford, evidence which indi-
cated a distinct probability of first-degree murder. After Alford
testified, the court accepted his plea of guilty to murder in the
second degree, notwithstanding his insistence upon his innocence.
After conviction and sentencing Alford commenced a series of peti-
tions for post-conviction relief, and he was ultimately successful.' 0
The precise issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether Al-
ford's fear of the death penalty for first-degree murder stripped his
guilty plea to second-degree murder of its voluntariness. The
Supreme Court held that it did not, citing Brady v. United States."
The Court went further, however, taking the opportunity to settle
the further question of whether or not an equivocal guilty plea
can be constitutionally accepted:'
2
. . . An individual accused of crime may voluntarily,
knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition
of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to
5. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 244 (1969). See North Caro-
lina v. Alford, 91 S. Ct. 160, 164 (1970).
6. Mr. Justice Harlan complained, in his Boykin dissent that the de-
cision there announced imposed the full requirements of FED. R. CRIM. P.
11 on the states. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 245 (1969). This would
appear to be inaccurate, since the majority opinion required only that the
state court determine that the plea is voluntary and intelligent.
7. North Carolina v. Alford, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970).
8. 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970).
9. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
10. Alford v. North Carolina, 405 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1968).
11. 397 U.S. 742 (1970). Brady was handed down after the fourth
circuit had vacated Alford's conviction. The Brady court held that a guilty
plea to kidnapping was neither coerced nor invalid because the defendant
made it in fear of the death penalty.
12. Some lower courts had held that acceptance of an equivocal
guilty plea would be a violation of due process per se. See, e.g., United
States ex rel. Metz v. Maroney, 404 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1968); United States
ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.13
But it is clear that the Court sanctioned the result in Aiford
only because the trial court had properly determined that the plea
was based on highly probable guilt.14 The Alford Court concluded
by remarking that state courts were free to reject equivocal pleas
in any event, and that there is no constitutional right to have a
guilty plea accepted. 15
Consequently, the state of the law appears to be that state
courts may accept equivocal guilty pleas, or they may reject them
entirely. But when an equivocal plea is accepted, the trial court
must insure that the plea is accurate by holding an inquisition
into the facts of the crime. The Alford rule is simple and direct,
but it is suggested that it is deceptively so. It will be argued in
the following Note that the real issues involved in the equivocal
guilty plea may be obscured behind the Alford rule, and that the
protective thrust of the decision may be misdirected.
A very brief look at some of the characteristics of the equivocal
guilty plea may help clarify the issues. First, what makes a guilty
plea equivocal? The equivocal element will generally arise from
doubts cast by a defendant's testimony at the pleading, or from
the known circumstances of the offense.' 6 For example, the equi-
vocal element may spring from a defendant's recital of his version
13. 91 S. Ct. at 167 (1970).
14. Despite the lack of a clearly enunciated rule, the Court's re-
peated advertence to the trial court's finding of a factual basis for the plea
clearly establishes this additional element as the keystone of the opinion.
For example, the Court in Alford stated:
Because of the importance of protecting the innocent and of
insuring that guilty pleas are a product of free and intelligent
choice, various state and federal court decisions properly caution
that pleas coupled with claims of innocence should not be ac-
cepted unless there is a factual basis for the plea ...
Id. at 167 n.10. The question of how probable a defendant's guilt must be
was not decided, although the Court characterized the evidence against
Alford as "overwhelming." Lower courts have employed other formula-
tions. Griffin v. United States, 405 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("high prob-
ability"); Commonwealth v. Cushnie, 433 Pa. 131, 249 A.2d 290 (1969) (suffi-
cient evidence of guilt for a jury to convict).
15. 91 S. Ct. at 168 n.11. There had been some suggestion in lower
court opinions that under certain circumstances a defendant does have an
absolute right to have his guilty plea accepted. See, e.g., City of Burbank
v. General Electric Co., 329 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1964) (anti-trust prosecution).
16. Unless there is some signal to alert the court to possible dis-
crepancies between the charge and the actual offense, a miscarriage of
justice may result. This dependence upon what may be a purely for-
tuitous discovery of the problem appears to be the basis for the require-
ment, in some jurisdictions, that every guilty plea must be examined for a
factual basis. See FED. R. Crm. P. 11; Resolution of the Judges of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia (1959), noted in
Everett v. United States, 336 F.2d 979, 980 n.3 (1964). The American Bar
Association recommends that the factual basis be determined for all guilty
pleas. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY (Approved Draft
1968) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS]. See also D. NEWMAN, CONVCTION
233-235 (1966) [hereinafter cited as NEWMAN].
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of the facts, indicating an improper charge if proved."7 Or it may
arise from a defendant's inability to remember or admit essen-
tial elements of the crime or participation.' 8 Or, in the extreme
case, the "equivocation" may consist of a defendant's outright de-
nial of guilt.'9 Courts appear to be about equally divided on the
question whether to accept guilty pleas under such circumstances. 20
The next question might logically be asked is: What is the
implication of an equivocal guilty plea? For example, is the
defendant's tergiversation a signal that he may be innocent,21 or
17. See, e.g., Griffin v. United States, 405 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(question of self-defense); United States ex rel. Metz v. Maroney, 404 F.2d
233 (3d Cir. 1968) (question of intent to murder); Tremblay v. Overholser,
199 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1961) (question of insanity); People v. Hethering-
ton, 379 Ill. 71, 39 N.E.2d 361 (1942) (question of intent to murder);
People v. Morrison, 348 Mich, 88, 81 N.W.2d 667 (1957) (question whether
second mortgagee knew that property was already mortgaged); State v.
Jones, 267 Minn. 421, 127 N.W.2d 153 (1964) (question of participation as
principal); State ex rel. Grattan v. Tahash, 262 Minn. 18, 113 N.W.2d 342
(1962) (question of intent to abandon); State ex rel. Dehning v. Rigg, 251
Minn. 121, 86 N.W.2d 723 (1957) (question of intent to abandon); Harris v.
State, 76 Tex. Crim. 126, 172 S.W. 975 (1915) (questions of self-defense,
insanity); State v. Rose, 42 Wash. 2d 509, 256 P.2d 493 (1953) (question of
intent in assault).
18. See, e.g., Hulsey v. United States, 369 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1966)
(defendant couldn't remember, had been drinking); Maxwell v. United
States, 368 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1966) (defendant could not remember, had
been intoxicated); United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp.
244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (defendant's mind "a complete black [sic]"); State v.
Martinez, 89 Idaho 129, 403 P.2d 597 (1965) (defendant could not recall in-
cident); State ex rel. Oney v. Tahash, 277 Minn. 394, 152 N.W.2d 526 (1967)
(defendant could not remember, had been drinking, taking "pills"); State
ex rel. Crossley v. Tahash, 263 Minn. 299, 116 N.W.2d 666 (1962) (defendant
did not recall, had been drinking); State v. Leyba, 80 N.M. 190, 453 P.2d 211
(1969) (defendant did not remember); Commonwealth v. Cushnie, 433 Pa.
131, 249 A.2d 290 (1969) (defendant did not know how crime occurred);
Commonwealth v. Cottrell, 433 Pa. 177, 249 A.2d 294 (1969) (defendant
could not remember).
19. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970); Bruce v.
United States, 379 F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1967); McCoy v. United States, 363
F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1966); State v. Reali, 26 N.J. 222, 139 A.2d 300 (1958);
People v. Nixon, 21 N.Y.2d 338, 287 N.Y.S.2d 659, 234 N.E.2d 687 (1967);
State v. Stacy, 43 Wash. 2d 358, 261 P.2d 400 (1953).
20. Of the twenty-five cases cited in notes 17-19 supra, thirteen
courts affirmed the convictions and twelve reversed them. No clear pat-
terns or rules evolve from the cases, each decision appearing to turn on the
particular facts of the case. There would appear to be some inconsistency
even within the same jurisdiction. See generally NEWMAN at 22, 27. The
only recurring theme is that acceptance of the plea should be discretion-
ary with the trial court. See, e.g., McCoy v. United States, 363 F.2d 306
(D.C. Cir. 1966); Tremblay v. Overholser, 199 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1961);
Commonwealth v. Cottrell, 433 Pa. 177, 249 A.2d 294 (1969); State v. Stacy,
43 Wash. 2d 358, 261 P.2d 400 (1953).
21. Included in the term "innocent" are those who may be guilty
emotionally disturbed, 22 or merely unable or unwilling to ad-
mit his guilt? 23 Or is the defendant perhaps trifling with the court,
possibly hoping to lay the ground-work for a post-conviction ap-
peal?
2 4
Finally, a short catalog of some of the policy considerations
weighing in the balance between accepting and rejecting equivo-
cal guilty pleas may help to bring the issues into focus. Points
which could be or have been advanced in favor of accepting such
pleas include the generally recognized importance of guilty pleas
to the functioning of the judicial process. 2 5 Rejection of equivo-
cal pleas, at least where a factual basis for the plea can be deter-
mined, might impose an appreciably heavier burden on the ad-
ministrators of justice. In view of the number of ways in which
doubt may be cast upon a plea,26 and the often uncertain implica-
tions of the doubt,27 rejection of such pleas, according to this
argument, would be not. only expensive but largely futile.
Secondly, it has been pointed out that when a guilty plea is re-
fused, and the defendant is forced to stand trial, the consequences
to the defendant can be drastic. 28 Third, it could now be argued,
the factual basis test presently required by Alford will serve
well enough to weed out the innocent among the equivocators.
Against accepting equivocal guilty pleas it has been argued
that acceptance of such pleas invites collateral attack on the plea
after conviction.2 9 Second, it could be argued that if a proper
only of a lesser offense than the one charged. This problem is recurrent
in crimes of intent, or attempt. Also included are those who may have a
defense (e.g., self-defense). It is unlikely that many defendants are com-
pletely innocent. NEWMAN at 15-16.
22. Insanity cases are the extreme example. Also included are those
who, while not insane, are clearly psychotic, and perhaps more deserving
of treatment than of punishment.
23. See, e.g., Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
24. See, e.g., Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(court accused equivocating defendant of "dilly-dallying"); State v. Stacy,
43 Wash. 2d 358, 261 P.2d 400 (1953) (equivocal plea leaves conviction open
to collateral attack). See also 8 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11.03 [4],
11-52 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as MoORE]; STANDARDS at 33.
25. See, e.g., Griffin v. United States, 405 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
HALL, K.AmiSAR, LAFAVE AND ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROcEDURE 924-946
(1969) [hereinafter cited as HALL]; MOORE t 11.02 at 11-4 to 11-5; NEW-
MAN at 3-6.
26. See notes 15-19 supra and accompanying text.
27. See notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Metz v. Maroney, 404 F.2d 233 (3d
Cir. 1968) (The prosecutor agreed to a plea to second-degree murder, stating
that he would recommend "not less than seven years." The court refused
the equivocal plea, defendant stood trial on first-degree murder and got
life.) Tremblay v. Overholser, 199 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1961) (The court
refused a plea to intoxication, found defendant not guilty by reason of in-
sanity, and committed her indefinitely to a mental hospital). See also
HALL at 983.
29. See, e.g., State v. Stacy, 43 Wash. 2d 358, 261 P.2d 400 (1953);
MOORE 11.03 [4], at 11-52; STANDARDS at 33.
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"factual basis" must be found for the plea, it might just as well
be found by trial.3 0 But whether or not this argument is valid, a
more basic objection to accepting equivocal pleas is that where
doubt is cast upon the guilty plea, the commitment to the trial pro-
cess, rather than to an inquisitional procedure, should prevail in
adjudicating guilt." Third, it has been pointed out that defen-
dants who feel that they have been "railroaded" into jail are
very likely to resist correctional measures, thus rendering a prin-
cipal purpose of incarceration nugatory.32 A defendant who will
not or cannot admit his guilt, according to this argument, is more
likely to resent his sentence than a defendant who has unre-
servedly acknowledged guilt.3
It is suggested that behind the problem of interpreting the
equivocal guilty plea, and behind the arguments adduced for and
against its acceptance, lurks a seminal problem in jurisprudence.
It is further suggested that if this jurisprudential problem can
be correctly identified, the derivative question of what to do with
equivocal guilty pleas can be more clearly answered. At the risk
of receding somewhat from the point of immediate legal relevance,
it may nonetheless be helpful to consider this jurisprudential prob-
lem in a more pristine form.
8 4
30. The American Bar Association believes the factual basis test will
take "far less time" than "full-scale trials." STANDARMS at 32. Moore notes
that the original version of the change to FED. R. CPuM. P. 11 required that
the court satisfy itself "that the defendant in fact committed the crime
charged." The version finally adopted, however, merely requires that the
court determine that a "factual basis" for the plea exists. See note 3 supra
and accompanying text. Moore comments that the version finally adopted
"contemplates a somewhat looser procedure" than the investigation which
would have been necessary to meet the test originally proposed. Moo-x
11.03 [4], at 11-47 to 11-48.
31. NEWMiAN at 4.
32. NEWMAN at 44-45; STANDARDS at 36-52. See generally HALL at
924 et seq.
33. A defendant may more particularly resent his conviction where
he has. steadily and completely denied guilt than where he has only re-
vealed doubts concerning specific elements of the crime, or where he "can't
remember." See notes 17-19, 22-23 supra and accompanying text. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court will apparently accept an equivocal plea
under the latter circumstances, but not when a complete denial is made.
Compare Commonwealth v. Cottrell, 433 Pa. 177, 249 A.2d 294 (1969) with
State v. Rose, 42 Wash. 2d 509, 256 P.2d 493 (1953). Moore comments:
"... To accept a plea in the face of a complete denial of involvement,
regardless of the strength of the incriminating evidence, is to invite col-
lateral attack." MooRE f 11.03 [4], at 11-52. Nonetheless, the United States
Supreme Court in Alford, faced with just such a denial, sanctioned the ac-
ceptance of the plea.
34. On first blush, it would appear that we are dealing here with the
same issues involved in plea-bargaining (negotiated pleas), or in with-
Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics,s5 defines injustice as the
intentional infliction of injury contrary to the wish of the person
injured. From this premise, a sorites leads to the conclusion that
an innocent man who asks for punishment may be foolish, but if he
thinks the bargain 6 good, no injustice results from punishing him,
for his will is done.3 7 But while a man cannot act unjustly to-
ward himself, Aristotle remarks that justice has not been done to
society, which is interested only in punishing the guilty.38 Re-
phrasing the problem in terms of the guilty plea, we arrive at the
question: Has a court constitutionally discharged its obligation to
see that justice is done when it has assured itself that the individ-
ual's bargain with society is voluntarily and intelligently (know-
ingly) made? Or must it also assure itself that the plea, and its sub-
sumed conviction,3 9 are accurate?40  In other words, are we
drawal of guilty pleas. But this conclusion may be misleading as well as
inaccurate. Plea bargaining occurs before a plea has been accepted, and
the problems here generally concern the fairness of the bargain (to defend-
ant and to society) after the plea has been accepted. That is, the negotiated
plea problem assumes that a plea has been accepted. The problem with
the equivocal plea, on the other hand, is whether to accept the plea at all,
regardless of how it was "negotiated." Similarly, problems in withdrawal
of pleas occur after acceptance. While many of the same considerations are
relevant to all three aspects of the plea, it is suggested that all three are
derivative from a common jurisprudential problem. Consequently, it may
be more helpful to go back to "first principles" rather than to attempt to
distinguish the derivative from the fundamental (albeit more contempo-
rary) related problems in pleading. In fact, failure to distinguish seminal
from derivative questions has apparently led to some "muddy" conclusions.
See note 36 infra and accompanying text.
35. Book V translated in FULLER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (temp
ed. 1949) [hereinafter cited as FULLER]. This translation was specially
prepared.
36. The bargain in question refers strictly to the defendant's admission
of guilt, and not to the fairness of the bargain negotiated with the prosecu-
tor. See note 34 supra. There would appear to be some confusion in the
use of the term "bargain" in this regard. For example, the cover of Vol
91, No. 4 of the Supreme Court Reporter (in which Alford appears) refers to
Alford as "the plea bargaining case." But the major concern in Alford is
not with defendant's bargain with the prosecutor. The Court somewhat
tersely disposed of this aspect of the case in favor of the state. See notes
11-12 supra and accompanying text. On the contrary, the principal prob-
lem addressed was whether Alford's equivocation amounted to a valid plea
at all. See notes 12-14 supra and accompanying text. An analogy from
the law of contracts may help to illustrate the point. Even though there
has been a valid acceptance (plea), the contract -(plea bargain) may still be
attacked because it is unconscionable, or because it was made under duress,
etc. Thus, there are two distinct problems: Was there an acceptance
(plea)? Was the contract (plea bargain) unconscionable, etc. (fair)? The
mechanics, indeed, the very justification of plea bargaining, is a large and
distinct problem, wholly outside the scope of this discussion.
37. FULLER at 54-56.
38. Id. at 57-58. Aristotle adduces the example of suicide, an illegal
act. While the one to suffer is the suicide himself, no wrong is done him
because he consented to the act. But society is wronged because the law
is broken.
39. It has been said that a confession is only an admission of conduct,
while a guilty plea logically subsumes the consent to be punished in addi-
tion to the admission of the act. North Carolina v. Alford, 91 S. Ct. 160,
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concerned with the justice of the bargain or the justice of the con-
viction?
41
The cases dealing with equivocal guilty pleas bring the con-
flict between the justice of the bargain and the justice of the convic-
tion into sharper focus. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
has stated:
.. . Our law only authorizes a conviction where guilt
is shown. If there be no legal guilt, a conviction could
not be sustained, although the defendant entered a plea of
guilty.
42
The United States District Court for Connecticut has held that it
was "utterly unreasonable" for counsel to recommend a guilty
plea without cautioning the defendant that "no matter what, he
should not plead guilty unless he believed himself guilty. '43  On
the other hand, the Supreme Court of Iowa stated:
... It matters not whether the defendant is in fact
guilty, the plea of guilty is just as effectual as if such was
the case. Reasons other than the fact that he is guilty
may induce a defendant to so plead . . .and the right of
164 (1970); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
40. The term "accurate," as used here, does not refer to the situation
in which a defendant pleads guilty to a lesser, but logically impossible
offense. Attacks on this type of conviction go to the plea-bargaining prob-
lem, not to the problem of essential innocence. See notes 21, 34, and 36
supra and accompanying text. Convictions upon voluntary and intelli-
gent guilty pleas to nonsequitur offenses are not vulnerable to attack
merely because the offense is, or was, logically anomalous. People v.
Foster, 19 N.Y.2d 150, 278 N.Y.S.2d 603, 225 N.E.2d 200 (1967).
41. This dilemma appears to find echoes in legal problems other than
those concerning guilty pleas. For example, the evidentiary corpus delicti
rule requires that the state prove its case even though the defendant has
confessed the crime and pleaded guilty. C. McCoRucK, LAW OF EVIDENCE
229-231 (1954). Or the problem could be considered from the point of
view of the withdrawing of guilty pleas. Some courts seem to suggest
that alleged innocence after a guilty plea is not grounds for attacking the
plea. Adam v. United States, 274 F.2d 880 (10th Cir. 1960), construing 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (providing remedies on a motion attacking sentence). But
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (a) provides in part:
... [B]ut to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence
may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defend-
ant to withdraw his plea.
One court interpreting Rule 32 (a) has concluded that it is broader in scope
than § 2255, and that consequently the question of innocence may be prop-
erly raised. Sims v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 577 (D. Md. 1966), aff'd,
382 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 961 (1968). Moore feels
that the question of innocence may be raised only under Rule 32(a), and
not under section 2255. MOORE 11.03 [4], at 11-59. The conflict between
the justice of the bargain and the justice of the conviction would seem
to be central to both the foregoing problems.
42. Harris v. State, 76 Tex. Crim. 126, 129, 172 S.W. 975, 977 (1915).
43. United States v. Rogers, 289 F. Supp. 726, 729 (D. Conn. 1968).
the defendant to so plead has never been doubted. 44
And the United States Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
has said:
... An accused, though believing in or entertaining
doubts respecting his innocence, might reasonably con-
clude a jury would be convinced of his guilt and that he
would fare better in the sentence by pleading guilty. ... .4
Although not always apparent in the cases themselves,"' it is sug-
gested that courts dealing with equivocal guilty pleas, as repre-
sented by the quotations above, have positioned themselves along
a spectrum having as its termini the two competing concepts, the
justice of the bargain and the justice of the conviction. If in fact
these two positions can be taken to represent countervailing at-
titudes about equivocal pleas, what has been the effect of the
Alford decision on the legal balance?
In those jurisdictions which adhere to the justice-of-the-bar-
gain principle, 47 that is, in those jurisdictions where the concern
is primarily with the voluntariness and intelligence of the plea,
48
the effect of Alford is to impose the further obligation of insur-
ing, as far as possible, that the plea is accurate as well. But there
is a tacit assumption in the Alford requirement that gives rise to
some doubts about the efficacy of the new rule. That assumption
is that the innocent are more likely than the guilty to equivocate
in pleading. 49 But what reason is there to believe that this as-
sumption is valid? It has been noted that emotional disturbance,
which may lead to an inaccurate plea, is difficult to detect in the
short space of an arraignment.50 And it is difficult to imagine why
an emotionally disturbed person would be likely to reveal his
problem by hedging his plea. A fortiori, a truly innocent, rational
man who, for his own reasons,5 1 chooses to "take the rap" is least
44. State v. Kaufman, 51 Ia. 578, 580, 2 N.W. 275, 276 (1879) (dictum).
45. McCoy v. United States, 363 F.2d 306, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Com-
pare United States v. Rogers, 289 F. Supp. 726 (D. Conn. 1968) (the view
that an innocent person will be convicted anyway is "not only cynical but
unwarranted"). See HALL at 977-989.
46. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
47. See notes 20 and 46 supra and accompanying text.
48. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
49. See passage quoted note 14 supra. The assumption may be de-
duced from the fact that the additional requirement (factual basis test) is
imposed upon courts accepting equivocal guilty pleas, as opposed to non-
equivocal pleas. Since, in the case of the former, the court must find a
factual basis, but may omit this step in the case of the latter, the clear
implication is that innocence is more likely to be uncovered among the
equivocators. Since the guilty plea itself subsumes both admission of the
crime and consent to be punished (see note 39 supra), the extra solicitude
in the case of the equivocator cannot be to confirm a guilt already ad-
mitted. Rather, the object must be to discover latent innocence.
50. STANDARDS at 31.
51. For example, a rational, innocent man may choose to plead guilty
in order to protect another person (from altruistic motives or otherwise), in
order to cover another greater crime, or because he is simply afraid of the
jury or of the court (as where defendant has escaped and been recaptured
before trial. See State v. Reali, 26 N.J. 222, 139 A.2d 300 (1958)).
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likely of all to tergiversate when pleading. Finally, there is no
evidence that those guilty of only a lesser crime are more likely
to equivocate. Indeed, it may well be that chief among the equiv-
ocators are the merely reluctant guilty and the dissemblers.5 2
Consequently, the asserted nexus between equivocation and in-
accuracy of plea (innocence of crime charged) would appear to be
problematic at best. Yet Alford singles out the equivocator for
the factual basis test, while ignoring those whose pleas are super-
ficially free from doubt. But if these latter pleas are just as likely,
if not more likely, to be factually suspicious,53 then Alford's pro-
tective reach will have been extended to the wrong defendants.
But there is a more fundamental objection to the acceptance of
equivocal guilty pleas in justice-of-the-bargain jurisdictions. It
would seem that if the concern is with the voluntariness and intelli-
gence of the plea, any equivocation should eo ipso require rejec-
tion of the plea. By his equivocation, the pleader has signalled
his dissatisfaction with the bargain, or at the very least, his latent
unwillingness to make it. Thus, regardless of whether equivo-
cators are more likely to be innocent or not, courts concerned
with the justice of the bargain should not'accept equivocal pleas.
Better practice in these jurisdictions should require an unequivo-
cal admission of guilt. In this regard, the practice in United States
military courts is instructive.
In courts-martial any statement of the accused inconsistent
with his plea of guilty must be expunged from the record before the
plea will be accepted.54  But military courts go further. They
require that the plea be rejected unless the court is satisfied that
the defendant has pleaded guilty "because he is convinced that
his is in fact guilty."5 5 Indeed, the defendant will be made to say
that he is convinced that he is in fact guilty.56 By focusing on the
defendant as the final arbiter of his subjective guilt, the military
courts have perhaps met most of the objections to the justice-of-
the-bargain point of view. 7 The basis for collateral attack on
52. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
53. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
54. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNIED STATES q 70, at 12-9 to 12-10,
app. 8a, at A8-9 to A8-10 (1968) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL]; MILITARY
JUDGES GUIDE 3-1 to 3-7 (Dept. of the Army Pamphlet 27-9, 1969) [here-
inafter cited as GUIDE].
55. MANUAL 70 at 12-9.
56. Id. app. 8a, at A8-10. In the version recommended in the GUID,
the military judge asks the accused: "Are you pleading guilty (not only
in the hope of securing a lenient sentence but) because you feeL in your
own mind that you are guilty?" GUIDE at 3-3 (emphasis added).
57. See notes 29-33 supra and accompanying text.
the plea will have largely disappeared with the equivocation, 5 as
will the case of the disgruntled prisoner, resisting rehabilitation
and bombarding courts with post-conviction writs because his
mind is being "gnawed by the cankering tooth of doubt" about
being "railroaded" over protests of innocence. 59
In jurisdictions concerned primarily with the justice of the con-
viction,0 Alford should have no effect at all. Where the court is
concerned with the accuracy of the plea as well as with its volun-
tariness and intelligence, all guilty pleas should be subjected to a
factual basis test.6' To single out the equivocator on the
basis of an asserted connection, tenuous at best, 2 between pos-
sible innocence and a hedged plea, is to drag a red herring across
the trial of the real solution. For in justice-of-the-conviction jur-
isdictions the solution must be that all guilty pleas be screened
for accuracy.63
Summary: It would appear that Alford, without favoring one
side or the other in the jurisprudential dispute, in encouraging
the states to make their own choices, has shed little light on the
underlying issues. Rather, Alford has extended the full panoply
of federal rules protection to a class of defendants who may not
need it, while ignoring a class of defendants who may require it.
And in regard to the latter class, Alford may even divert atten-
tion from the effort to give closer scrutiny to all guilty pleas.
It is suggested that whatever may be required by constitutional
due process, the equivocal guilty plea is inconsistent with the
administration of justice when considered from the point of view of
the defendant; and that acceptance of any guilty plea, equivocal
or otherwise, without an investigation of its factual basis, is in-
consistent with the administration of justice when considered from
the point of view of society.
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58. See notes 29 and 41 supra and accompanying text.
59. See notes 32-33 supra and accompanying text.
60. It should not be inferred that military courts are such jurisdic-
tions. The emphasis in the military system is on guilt in fact, and not
upon the justice of the bargain. Both the MANUAL and the GuIDm provide
for a determination of the factual basis of the plea where there is any doubt
about its accuracy; and, if the doubts are substantial, trial follows. MANUAL
70, at 12-10 app. 8a, at A8-9 to A8-10. GuiDE at 3-4.
61. Other avenues may of course lead to the discovery of plea in-
fimities, e.g., the pre-sentence report or the post-pleading hearing. NEW-
MAN at 10-22. But the likelihood of discovery by these means is too varia-
ble and erratic to be reliable at present, although improvement seems to
be the trend. Id. Nonetheless, to accept the plea first and then investigate
its validity would seem to be putting the cart before the horse.
62. See notes 49-52 supra and accompanying text.
63. See note 16 supra.
64. No suggestion is made here that either the justice-of-the-bargain
or the justice-of-the-conviction point of view is preferable to the other.
This Note is concerned only with discovering the bases of the points of
view, and with developing what would appear to be logically consistent
treatment of equivocal guilty pleas derived therefrom.
